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II. STATEMENT OF THE CASE
A. Nature of the Case
Michael Jared Thompson (Jared) appeals from the summary dismissal of his
petition for post-conviction relief. Amended Clerk’s Record (R) 122-132. Relief
should be granted because the district court erred in summarily dismissing Jared’s
claims of ineffective assistance of trial and appellate counsel. Jared’s claims raise a
genuine issue of material fact as to whether trial counsel was ineffective in basing
the defense in an involuntary manslaughter case on the existence of an intervening
cause without requesting proximate and intervening cause instructions. Jared’s
claims also raise a genuine issue of material fact as to whether appellate counsel
was ineffective in raising an insufficiency of the evidence issue which could not
succeed instead of an issue of fundamental error in the failure to properly instruct
the jury as to causation which would have succeeded.
B. Procedural History
Jared was convicted of involuntary manslaughter. I.C. § 18-4006(2). The jury
also found an enhancement for the use of a deadly weapon. I.C. § 19-2520. The
district court sentenced him to a term of 15 years with a minimum fixed term of five
years followed by an indeterminate term of ten years. R 5-6.
Jared appealed. And, the Court of Appeals denied relief in an unpublished
decision. R 6.
Jared then filed a timely petition for post-conviction relief. He raised two
claims which are relevant to this appeal:
1

1) Ineffective assistance of trial counsel in failing to request proximate
cause and intervening cause jury instructions;
2) Ineffective assistance of appellate counsel in failing to raise
fundamental error in the failure to properly instruct the jury regarding
causation.
R 5-12.
Jared also filed motions for appointment of counsel and judicial notice of the
records and transcripts from the underlying criminal case. R 54-57; 72-75.
The state filed an answer and a motion for summary dismissal. R 63-67; 8195.
Following a hearing, the court dismissed Jared’s petition. R 108-113.
The court entered a final judgment. Jared filed a timely notice of appeal. R
114-117. On February 6, 2017, the Supreme Court entered an order augmenting
the record on appeal with the Clerk’s Record, transcripts, and Court of Appeals’
opinion from the underlying criminal case.
C. Statement of Facts
On December 16, 2011, Jared and three friends, Khali Jones, Kristin Crull,
and Michael Blair, spent the evening together. Khali, Kristin, and Michael all
lived with Kristin’s mother. Kristin and Michael had previously dated; however, by
December 2011, their relationship was like that of brother and sister. Augmented
R 485-486 (Trial Tr. p. 280, ln. 17-p. 287, ln. 17).
Kristin drove Khali and Mike to Jared’s house. Then Jared drove everyone in
his 4-door crew cab pickup to the Riverside Bar in Burley, Idaho. At the Riverside,
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Jared and Michael ordered beers, Kristin ordered an AMF1, and Khali ordered a
Pepsi. After Jared and Michael played a couple of games of pool, the group went to
another bar, Mustang Sally’s. Augmented R 486-487 (Trial Tr. p. 286, ln. 8-p. 290,
ln. 17).
Jared and Michael continued to drink beer. Augmented R 487 (Trial Tr. p.
291, ln. 12-16). Khali drank three AMFs and a shot. Id. (Trial Tr. p. 291, ln. 20-21).
Kristin had five more AMFs and two shots. Augmented R 488 (Trial Tr. p. 294, ln.
1).
Khali testified that at about 11:00 p.m., “Some Mexican took [Kristin] outside
and tried to get her to go with him somewhere.” Id. (Trial Tr. p. 293, ln. 22-23).
Khali followed them out and finally pulled Kristin back inside the bar. Id. (Trial
Tr. p. 294, ln. 6-10).
Back in the bar, Kristin yelled at Michael, because he had told the man to
take her outside. Michael replied that it was a joke and he had not expected the
man to actually take her outside. Then he went over and confronted the man,
drawing a knife on him to make sure that he understood to stay away from Kristin.
This made Kristin angrier and she and Michael continued to argue. Id. (Trial Tr. p.
294, ln. 12-p. 295, ln. 6).
The arguing continued. About midnight Jared suggested that they should all

1

According to Khali, an AMF is an “Adios Motherfucker” and contains five
types of alcohol. She testified that drinking just one results in being over the legal
limit to drive. Augmented R 487 (Trial Tr. p. 289, ln. 9-16).
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leave. Outside, Kristin tried to climb into the backseat of the truck with Michael,
but he pushed her out and slammed the door. She walked off. Khali told Jared that
Kristin could not walk home, so he went and got her. He pushed Kristin into the
front seat, Khali sat in the back with Michael, and they left. Augmented R 488-489
(Trial Tr. p. 295, ln. 16-p. 296, ln. 12).
Jared drove. Kristin and Michael continued to argue. And, Khali rolled
down her window because she thought she was going to be sick. Augmented R 489
(Trial Tr. p. 296, ln. 13-22).
As the trip progressed, Khali rolled her window back up. As she did, she
heard Jared say, “If one of you don’t shut up, I’m going to shoot somebody.” And,
she saw that he had a gun in a holster. Id. (Trial Tr. p. 297, ln. 9-12).
Michael laughed. Then Jared said, “You think I’m kidding?” And, the gun
was out of the holster and cocked twice. Id. (Trial Tr. p. 297, ln. 13-21).
Jared held the gun in his right hand and continued to drive with his left. He
put his elbow on the center console and pointed the gun upwards and backwards.
Id. (Trial Tr. p. 297, ln. 2-p. 300, ln. 13).
Michael slid over to the middle of the backseat. He said, “If you’re going to
shoot somebody, it might as well be me. End my miserable existence.” He put his
hand on Jared’s hand and his mouth around the barrel of the gun. Augmented R
490 (Trial Tr. p. 300, ln. 18-22).
Khali turned her head and the gun went off. Id. (Trial Tr. p. 300, ln. 24-p.
301, ln. 1).
4

Michael’s head hit Khali’s leg. Kristin yelled at Jared to pull over. Jared
said that Michael had pulled the trigger. And, he pulled the truck into his driveway
which was about 20-50 yards away. Augmented R 495 (Trial Tr. p. 320, ln. 7-15);
Augmented R 498 (Trial Tr. p. 335, ln. 9-17).
In the driveway, Khali told Kristin that Michael was dead. Kristin told her
to shut up. Khali got out of the truck and ran. She wanted to get her children and
get as far away as possible. As she ran down the highway, she stopped and spoke
with a police officer conducting an unrelated traffic stop. When asked, she told him
that nothing was wrong and ran on. Later, her brother convinced her to go to the
sheriff’s office and tell officials what had happened. Augmented R 495-496 (Trial
Tr. p. 320, ln. 16-p. 324, ln. 2).
Kristin pushed Jared down onto the ground and took off with his truck. She
hit her own car in his driveway and then drove into a field. Police stopped her after
a neighbor reported an erratic driver. Kristin, who was hysterical and hard to
understand, did not tell the police about Michael. Instead, she became combative.
An officer arrested her for DUI and not having a valid license and placed her in the
patrol car. Augmented R 483 (Trial Tr. p. 273, ln. 16-p. 274, ln. 16); Augmented R
502 (Trial Tr. p. 349, ln. 16-p. 351, ln. 10). When the officer went to check the
truck, he discovered Michael. Augmented R 503 (Trial Tr. p. 352, ln. 13-17).
Jared called 911. He said that he had been kicked out of his truck and was
not sure where he was or what was going on. Augmented R 480 (Trial Tr. p. 262,
ln. 8-16). When an officer arrived, Jared was yelling for help. He said that someone
5

had taken his truck and that there were guns inside it. Jared, incoherent and
shaking, looked like he was in shock. Augmented R 507 (Trial Tr. p. 368, ln. 12-14);
Augmented R 509 (Trial Tr. p. 376, ln. 10-25). Jared could not remember how he
got home. But, at one point, he asked how Michael was. Augmented R 512 (Trial
Tr. p. 390, ln. 13-22).
Jared later told the police that Michael put the gun in his own mouth, put his
hands over Jared’s hands, and the gun went off while both their hands were on it.
Augmented R 519 (Trial Tr. p. 417, ln. 6-12). However, Jared never said that he
(Jared) had his finger on the trigger. Augmented R 520 (Trial Tr. p. 423, ln. 12-13).
Rather, he said, “And I wasn’t expecting him to grab my hand, either, or grab the
gun. . . . I don’t know why somebody would do that.” Augmented R 545 (Trial Tr. p.
520, ln. 1-13).
Khali did not see Jared point the gun at anyone. And, she did not see either
Michael’s or Jared’s finger on the trigger of the gun. Augmented R 498 (Trial Tr. p.
332, ln. 14- p.334, ln. 16-25). Khali testified that due to the configuration of the
truck seats, Jared could not see Michael and Michael could not see Jared. She
testified that even when Jared held the gun pointed to the back, a bullet could not
have hit anyone if Michael had not slid over and placed the barrel in his mouth. Id.
(Trial Tr. p. 333, ln. 18-p. 334, ln. 15).
Defense counsel laid out his case in opening statement:
You are not here to decide, ladies and gentlemen, whether the evidence
shows that [Jared] acted in an honorable fashion, that he acted as the
best of citizens would, but you are here to look at the evidence and
6

decide whether he killed Michael Blair, and we believe the evidence
will show that he did not. Unfortunately, and I say this as a parent,
Michael Blair is gone because Michael Blair put what he knew to be a
loaded gun into his own mouth, having moved into a position where he
could do that. Whether pulling on the gun caused the gun to go off if
the trigger had been touched by Jared, or whether Michael himself did
what Jared yelled out, “he pulled the trigger,” Michael Blair killed
himself.
It’s Halloween[2], ladies and gentlemen, and the prosecutor has taken a
case of suicide and dressed it in the costume of homicide and wants you
to go trick or treating. When you hear all the facts in this case, you
will agree, Michael Thompson is dead – excuse me, Michael Blair is
dead at his own hand, and Jared Thompson is not guilty.
Augmented R 478-479 (Trial Tr. p. 255, ln. 14-p. 256, ln. 9).
Counsel reiterated this defense in closing:
State has to show beyond a reasonable doubt that this young man
caused the death. He produced the death. What produced the death in
this case, ladies and gentlemen? A gun barrel. A gun barrel that was
put inside the mouth of Michael Blair, plus a trigger pull, which I’ve
represented to you people that that equals death. Now there may have
been many things that were going on, there may have been many
things that contributed to that equation, but that’s what produced the
death in this case. You could not have a death as it happened in this
case until there was a gun barrel inside the mouth of Michael Blair
and the trigger of the gun was pulled.
And, ladies and gentlemen, if you have been convinced by the
prosecution’s evidence that this young man beyond a reasonable doubt
placed that gun barrel in the mouth of Michael Blair and pulled that
trigger, not only can you find him guilty, it is your duty to find him
guilty. But, if you can’t find beyond a reasonable doubt that he did
those two things then you cannot find him guilty, because that’s what
caused the death.
Now the prosecution has a theory, a clever theory, in which they are
apparently quite proud. They say that if Michael had not been drunk,

2

The opening statement was made on October 31, 2012. R 126.
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this wouldn’t have happened. That might be true. They have said
that if Jared had not been drunk this might not have happened. That’s
true. They say that if Jared had not pulled the gun out from under the
console, this never could have happened. That’s true. They say if he
had not cocked it, this never could have happened. Again, you’re going
to find that’s true.
The problem with that, ladies and gentlemen, is that it doesn’t go to
the heart of causation. It doesn’t go to what your jury instructions tell
you. The jury instructions don’t say that Jared Thompson can be
found guilty if you find that his actions contributed to them. They
have to have caused the death. Something that the prosecutors like to
stay away from, and I don’t blame them. It [is] not a good area for
them. It interferes with their creativity.
And how far do you take that? Well, you can take it a long way. You
can say that if Jared Thompson had not gone out that evening at all, if
he’d simply stayed home, this never would have happened. You can
say that if he’d never gotten into the truck this never would have
happened. And that’s true as well.
Well, let’s go back further, ladies and gentlemen, because there are
people in this state and this country who would say the real problem
and the real responsibility is on whoever it was that sold the gun to
Jared Thompson. And we can certainly say and agree that if Jared
Thompson had not bought that gun this wouldn’t have happened. We
can say if someone had not sold him the gun this wouldn’t have
happened.
And we can go even further than that if we want to. We can say that
those who manufactured the gun caused it, because if they hadn’t
manufactured this gun Michael Blair would be alive today. And that
would be true.
But because it’s true doesn’t mean that this equation is any less
controlling. So what you need to do is what the prosecutors haven’t
done and won’t do, and that is, focus on the cause of death. Who put
the gun barrel in the mouth of Michael Blair and who pulled the
trigger. Because, of course, if you have the gun barrel in the mouth
and there is no pulling of the trigger, then there is no death. Or if the
gun barrel is not in the mouth, but if the trigger is pulled and the
bullet hits the roof and everybody’s scared to death and they’re upset
and they may be in shock, then there is no death.
8

So we’ve got to get down to causation, ladies and gentlemen. That is
what this case is all about. I don’t agree with the prosecutors about
much in this case, but I will agree that the testimony of [Khali] Jones
is essentially reliable testimony. There is no reason to believe that
things happened much different than she describes it. In fact the
prosecutors appear to give her the prosecutorial seal of approval, so
you can believe everything she says. Okay, fine.
And what did she say? In a very telling phrase, she says, the gun did
not move to Michael; Michael moved to the gun. Now if you’re taking
the advice of the prosecutors, if you are doing what they ask you to do,
then you have to believe what [Khali] Jones said. The gun did not
move to Michael Blair; he moved to the gun.
What else did she say? He put his hands – you could see him put his
hands on the hand that was holding the gun and put the gun barrel in
his mouth. Prosecutorial seal of approval. This element is gone. It
wasn’t Jared Thompson who put the gun barrel in the mouth of
Michael Blair, it was Michael Blair who did so.
Who pulled the trigger? Well, prosecutor has his theory, the
government has his theory, you’re welcome to it. And the question
here is not whether that could have happened, because it could have.
It might have happened. The question is, are you convinced beyond a
reasonable doubt. Are you certain that that young man, rather than
his friend Michael Blair, pulled the trigger? And there’s nothing in
this case that gives you the right, that gives you the direction, to find
beyond a reasonable doubt that that happened, because [Khali] Jones
has told you that she never saw Michael’s hand on the trigger – finger
on the trigger; but that she also never saw Jared Thompson’s finger on
the trigger. Almost immediately after the gun went off Jared says,
[h]e pulled the trigger – or Mike pulled the trigger. You don’t have to
believe that, you can say I don’t believe that, but that doesn’t mean
that you can say I’m certain beyond a reasonable doubt that his finger
was on the trigger. Where is the evidence that his finger was on the
trigger?
I know what their theory is. I know what is being said here: That you
should assume it this way because it’s more logical than that way, and
so on and so on and so on. But where is the evidence that his finger
was on the trigger? There’s no fingerprint and there’s no eye witness
testimony and there’s no admission. The only thing that’s out there is
a statement at the time by the defendant that he didn’t pull the
9

trigger. That’s it. So when the state has failed to show both of these
elements this case has no basis in fact at all.
Augmented R 387-389 (Trial Tr. p. 59, ln. 24-p. 64, ln. 18).
Counsel returned to this theme as he ended his argument:
And let me provide you, as I get ready to close, with an example of
exactly what it is I’m talking about. Imagine, if you will, that these
same facts and circumstances exist, except there is no gun, but
argument is going on and Jared Thompson has become agitated and
frustrated and angry and he wants it to end. He speeds the truck up to
100 miles an hour. He’s not under the influence, he’s driving 100 miles
an hour on a rural road and then he starts pulling the wheel back and
forth and he says, If you two don’t shut up I’m going to run this truck
off the road and kill somebody, and Michael Blair says, Well, if you’re
going to kill somebody it just as well be me and end my miserable
existence, opens the door to the truck and jumps out and is killed, did
Jared Thompson cause that death? If he hadn’t been driving the truck,
it wouldn’t have happened. If he hadn’t been intoxicated, it wouldn’t
have happened. If he hadn’t been driving recklessly, it wouldn’t have
happened. So did that make him the cause of the death? You wouldn’t
believe that for a minute, ladies and gentlemen. You’d say that was
irresponsible behavior, that was reckless behavior, that was behavior
that nobody ought to engage in, but that didn’t cause the death. When
the door was opened and Michael Blair jumped out, he caused the
death. Same thing is true.
...
. . . Halloween is over, the case is out of its costume. It’s not homicide,
it’s not manslaughter. It may be suicide, it may be a terrible accident,
but it is not a killing of a human being by Michael Jared Thompson.
Ladies and gentlemen, thank you very much.
Augmented R 391 (Trial Tr. p. 74, ln. 21-p. 77, ln. 8).
Defense counsel continued this theme in his argument at sentencing: “Not
that this man acted responsibly; he didn’t. But that but for the actions of the
putative victim this crime could not and would not have been committed.” Aug. R
10

400-401 (Trial Tr. p. 105, ln. 24-p. 106, ln. 2. “. . . the state seems unwilling even
today, more than a year after all of this occurred, to acknowledge what is obvious,
and that is, that unless Michael Blair slides clear across the seat, grabs that gun
and puts it in his mouth, there can be no death.” Augmented R 401 (Trial Tr. p.
106, ln. 24-p. 107, ln. 4).
I have no doubt . . . Michael Blair would look right back at Your Honor
and say, You know, Judge, Jared was foolish and he was reckless. If
he’d never taken that gun out I’d be alive today. But you know what,
Judge? I was foolish. I was reckless. If I’d stayed back in my seat, if I
hadn’t slid across the seat, if I hadn’t grabbed that gun, if I hadn’t put
the gun in my mouth and caused the trigger to be pulled, I’d be alive
today. . . .
Augmented R 403 (Trial Tr. p. 115, ln. 15-24).
With regard to jury instructions, the state requested an aiding and abetting
instruction under the theory that the jury could conclude that Jared had aided and
abetted Michael in either his (Michael’s) crime of manslaughter with himself as the
victim or Michael’s crime of suicide. Augmented R 557-560 (Trial Tr. p. 570, ln. 1-p.
580, ln. 10).
Defense counsel argued against an aiding and abetting instruction, but did
not request a proximate cause/intervening cause instruction. Rather, he requested
this instruction:
The Defendant, Michael Jared Thompson, is charged in this case with
Involuntary Manslaughter[.] Manslaughter is the unlawful killing of a
human being without malice. In charging the Defendant with
involuntary manslaughter, the State must prove, beyond a reasonable
doubt that [(]1) a death occurred, and (2) the defendant unlawfully
caused that death.

11

Augmented R 83; 559-560 (Trial Tr. p. 576, ln. 22-p. 581, ln. 15).
He further requested this instruction:
In order for the defendant to be guilty of Involuntary Manslaughter by
negligent use of a deadly weapon, the state must prove each of the
following:
1. On or about December 16, 2011
2. in the state of Idaho
3. the defendant Michael Jared Thompson used a firearm with
reckless disregard of the consequences and of the rights of others,
4. producing the death of Michael Kenneth Blair.
If any of the above has not been proven beyond a reasonable doubt, you
must find the defendant not guilty. If each of the above has been
proven beyond a reasonable doubt, then you must find the defendant
guilty.
Augmented R 85.
The court gave Instruction No. 8 which included the statement: “If anyone
states a rule of law different from any I tell you, it is my instruction that you must
follow.” Augmented R 186.
The court also gave the instructions requested by defense counsel.
Augmented R 188-189.
The court did not instruct the jury as to the definition of “producing the
death” or “unlawfully caused that death.” The court did not instruct on proximate
or intervening cause. Augmented R 185-201.
The jury returned a guilty verdict. Augmented R 201.
On appeal, counsel raised three issues: 1) insufficient evidence to support the
12

conviction; 2) abuse of discretion in sentencing; and 3) abuse of discretion in
denying a Criminal Rule 35 motion. Counsel did not argue that the failure to
instruct on proximate and intervening causes was fundamental error. Augmented
R 562-564.
The Court of Appeals declined to address the sufficiency of the evidence
argument. Counsel argued that the state had failed to establish that Jared caused
Michael’s death. The Court held that it would not consider whether the state
presented sufficient evidence to prove that Jared’s actions were the proximate cause
of Michael’s death because the jury was not instructed on proximate or intervening
cause. “[H]e asks this Court to determine the sufficiency of the evidence for
findings that the jury was never asked to make. We will not do so.” The Court
further noted that the jury may have applied only an actual cause (but-for cause)
standard to determine guilt for which the evidence was sufficient and that the
question of whether the evidence was sufficient to convict on proximate cause and
intervening cause was a different question. Augmented R 563.
III. ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL
A. Did the district court err in summarily dismissing the claim of ineffective
assistance of counsel in failing to request proximate and intervening cause jury
instructions?
B. Did the district court err in summarily dismissing the claim of ineffective
assistance of appellate counsel in failing to raise a claim of fundamental error in
failing to properly instruct the jury regarding proximate and intervening cause?
13

IV. ARGUMENT
A. The District Court Erred in Summarily Dismissing Jared’s Petition for
Post- Conviction Relief
1. Standard of Review
Idaho Code § 19-4906 authorizes summary dismissal of an application
for post-conviction relief, either pursuant to motion of a party or upon
the trial court’s own initiative. Summary dismissal of an application is
the procedural equivalent of summary judgment under IRCP 56.
When reviewing the grant of a motion for summary judgment, this
Court applies the same standard used by the district court in ruling on
the motion. Likewise, when reviewing a district’s order of summary
dismissal in a post-conviction relief proceeding, we apply the same
standard as that applied by the district court. Thus, when reviewing
such a dismissal, this Court must determine whether a genuine issue
of fact exists based on the pleadings, depositions and admissions
together with any affidavits on file.
Ridgley v. State, 148 Idaho 671, 675, 227 P.3d 925, 929 (2010) (internal quotations
and citations omitted).
“[I]f the petitioner’s alleged facts are uncontroverted by the State . . . [they]
must be regarded as true.” Phillips v. State, 108 Idaho 405, 407, 700 P.2d 27, 29
(1985), as quoted in Ridgley v. State, supra.
Moreover, “if the petition, affidavits and other evidence supporting the
petition allege facts that, if true, would entitle the petitioner to relief, the postconviction claim may not be summarily dismissed.” Stevens v. State, 156 Idaho 396,
405, 327 P.3d 372, 381 (Ct. App. 2013).
A claim of ineffective assistance of counsel is analyzed under Strickland v.
Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 104 S.Ct. 2052 (1984). To prevail a petitioner must
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prove: 1) counsel’s performance was deficient in that it fell below standards of
reasonable professional performance; and 2) this deficient performance was
prejudicial. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. at 689, 104 S.Ct. at 2065.
Prejudice is shown if there is a reasonable probability that a different result would
have been obtained had the attorney acted properly. Id.
2. The District Court Erred in Summarily Dismissing the Claim of
Ineffective Assistance of Counsel in Failing to Request Proximate and
Intervening Cause Jury Instructions
The district court summarily dismissed the claim that trial counsel was
ineffective in failing to request proper causation instructions “[b]ecause there is no
evidence that a proximate cause or intervening cause jury instruction would be
applicable in this case” and thus counsel was not deficient. R 109. Further, the
court concluded that Jared had not demonstrated prejudice “because there was no
evidence that the outcome would have changed had the jury instructions been
included.” Id.
As argued by post-conviction counsel, the district court’s conclusions are
contrary to the Court of Appeals’ decision in the direct appeal. Tr. p. 13, ln. 8-17.
In the direct appeal, in discussing the sufficiency of the evidence, the Court of
Appeals stated, “On a charge of involuntary manslaughter, the issue of proximate
cause is, in the first instance, for the jury.” Augmented R 563, citing State v.
Montheith, 53 Idaho 30, 40, 20 P.2d 1023, 1027 (1933).
Montheith appealed his conviction for involuntary manslaughter arguing
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that the district court erred in not instructing the jury on the lesser offense of
reckless driving. The Supreme Court held:
The issue of proximate cause in this case was for the jury, and the
court carefully instructed as to proximate cause and the necessity of
the jury finding that negligence or some other unlawful act of the
defendant was the proximate cause of the death. Subdivision 5,
instruction No. 13.
Defendant, to sustain his position on this point, must concede that the
jury could have found him guilty of reckless driving. If guilty of
reckless driving, and if there is no evidence to show any intervening
cause between the negligent driving and the infliction of the death blow,
then there is no evidence to justify the giving of an instruction on the
lesser offense, as the defendant would perforce be guilty of
manslaughter.
Id. (emphasis added.)
In Jared’s direct appeal, the Court of Appeals followed the Supreme Court’s
holding in Montheith that proximate cause is a jury question and that an
intervening cause would preclude a conviction for involuntary manslaughter.
Augmented R 563. In dismissing the post-conviction claim, the district court
determined that an intervening cause instruction would not have been allowed at
trial because “[t]he victim’s conduct was neither unforeseeable nor extraordinary
under the entirety of the circumstances as is required for the break in the causal
chain.” R 109. The court further reasoned that because there was a causation
finding by the jury in finding Jared guilty, it is unclear why an additional
instruction on proximate cause was necessary or would have changed the outcome.
Id.
State v. Lampien, 148 Idaho 367, 223 P.3d 750 (2009), sets out the law on
16

causation:
An intervening, superseding cause generally refers to an independent
act or force that breaks the causal chain between the defendant’s
culpable act and the victim’s injury. The intervening cause becomes
the proximate cause of the victim’s injury and removes the defendant’s
act as the proximate cause. To relieve a defendant of criminal liability,
an intervening cause must be an unforeseeable and extraordinary
occurrence. The defendant remains criminally liable if either the
possible consequence might reasonably have been contemplated or the
defendant should have foreseen the possibility of harm of the kind that
could result from his act. In most contexts, a crime or an intentional
tort constitutes an ‘independent, intervening cause’ that precludes a
defendant’s antecedent crime from being a proximate cause.
148 Idaho at 374-75, 223 P.3d at 757-58 (citations omitted).
In this case, Michael’s act of declaring his willingness to die, moving across
the car seat and placing the gun in his mouth was undisputedly unforeseen and
extraordinary. No evidence at trial indicated that prior to Michael’s inexplicable
act anyone knew that he was ready to end his life or that anyone in the car had
reason to believe that he would ever put a loaded gun in his mouth. Moreover,
Michael’s act was in itself a crime as evidenced by the state’s request for aiding and
abetting instructions at trial. Applying the law set out in Montheith and Lampien,
if counsel had requested causation instructions including an instruction on
intervening, superseding cause, the instructions would have been appropriate.
Notably, Idaho Supreme Court precedent on this issue is consistent with the
law of other states. People v. Saavedra-Rodriguez, 971 P.2d 223 (Colo. 1998), cited
in Lampien, holds that grossly negligent medical treatment is an intervening cause
of death if the initial wound would probably have not been fatal without the

17

treatment. In Jared’s case, Michael would not have been shot at all if he had not
moved across the seat and placed the gun in his mouth - thus, as discussed in
Saavedra-Rodriguez, there would not have been any wound, let alone a fatal wound
and Michael’s act was an intervening cause.
Wagner v. State, 921 So.2d 38 (Fla. App. 2006), is also consistent. Police
killed Wagner’s partner as he and Wagner fled from an armed robbery. Wagner
faced several charges, including felony murder for the death of his partner. The
Florida court reversed the murder conviction because the district court denied
Wagner’s requests to present evidence and have a jury instruction to support his
theory that his partner committed “suicide by cop,” an independent act which broke
the causal relationship between the underlying felony and the death.
Similarly, in State v. Shumway, 672 P.2d 929 (Az. 1983), the court reversed a
conviction for negligent homicide, holding that the jury should have been instructed
on the duty to yield the right of way when turning left, as the victim’s alleged
negligence might have relieved the defendant of criminal responsibility. See also,
Buckles v. State, 830 P.2d 702, 707 (Wyo. 1992) (reversing in part for failure to
admit evidence or instruct jury on defendant’s theory that the victim’s cocaineimpaired driving rather than the defendant’s alcohol-impaired driving caused the
death); State v. Woodman, 735 P.2d 1102, 1107 (Kan. App. 1987) (reversing in part
for failure to instruct on intervening cause in support of defendant’s theory that
victim’s running a red light, not defendant’s DUI, caused death); Williams v. State,
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554 P.2d 842, 847 (Okla.Ct.App. 1976) (reversing for failure to instruct jury on
intervening cause to support defendant’s theory that bicyclist’s weaving in the
center of lane, rather than defendant’s negligence, caused death).
The district court erred in concluding that a proximate cause or intervening
cause jury instruction would not be applicable to Jared’s case. The law in Idaho is
not in dispute and supports giving such an instruction. Insofar as the district
court’s determination of lack of a genuine issue of material fact as to counsel’s
deficient performance rested on its conclusion that proximate and intervening cause
instructions would not apply to the case, the court was wrong.
The state as the moving party initially carries the burden of establishing the
absence of a genuine issue of material fact. Boswell v. Steele, 158 Idaho 554, 559,
348 P.3d 497, 502 (Ct. App. 2015), citing Eliopuos v. Knox, 123 Idaho 400, 404, 848
P.2d 984, 988 (Ct. App. 1992). As the state would not carry the burden of
production of proof at the evidentiary hearing, it could meet its burden of
establishing an absence of a genuine issue of material fact by establishing the
absence of evidence on an element that Jared would be required to prove to obtain
post-conviction relief. Boswell v. Steele, supra.
The courts hold the movant to a strict standard. To satisfy his burden
the movant must make a showing that is quite clear what the truth is,
and that excludes any real doubt as to the existence of any genuine
issue of material fact.
G & M Farms v. Funk Irrigation Co., 119 Idaho 514, 526, 808 P.2d 851, 863 (1991),
quoting Collord v. Cooley, 92 Idaho 789, 795, 451 P.2d 535, 541 (1969).
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The state asserted that Jared’s claim of ineffective assistance of trial counsel
should be summarily dismissed because the jury was properly instructed on
causation and therefore Jared could not prove deficient performance as required by
Strickland, supra. R 90-91. This basis for summary dismissal fails because, as set
out above, the court failed to properly instruct the jury as to causation. Thus, per
Boswell, supra, the court should have denied the motion for summary dismissal.
Further, counsel’s entire defense was based upon proximate and intervening
cause. Yet, under the instructions the jury could not consider that defense. Idaho
has found similar failures to be deficient performance. See McKay v. State, 148
Idaho 567, 572, 225 P.3d 700, 705 (2010), holding that failure to object to an
improper causation instruction in a vehicular manslaughter case was ineffective
assistance where the defense was based upon causation.
The state did not assert that Jared had failed to raise a genuine issue of
material fact as to prejudice under Strickland. R 90-91. However, the district court
also based its summary dismissal upon its conclusion that Jared did not
demonstrate any prejudice as “there is no evidence that the outcome would have
changed had the jury instructions been included.” R 109. However, Jared did put
evidence before the district court through his motion for judicial notice of the
records and transcripts of the underlying criminal case. “A court determining
whether the petitioner has met his burden [of demonstrating prejudice under
Strickland] must consider the totality of the evidence presented at trial.” Curless v.
State, 146 Idaho 95, 101, 190 P.3d 914, 920 (Ct. App. 2008), citing Strickland,
20

supra.
The records and transcripts from the trial raise a genuine issue of material
fact as to whether there is a reasonable probability that a different result would
have been obtained had the attorney acted properly. Strickland, supra. See State v.
Dunlap, 155 Idaho 345, 388, 313 P.3d 1, 44 (2013), finding significant evidence of
prejudice.
Under the instructions given, the jury could not consider the defense offered.
They were instructed to convict if “the defendant Michael Jared Thompson used a
firearm with reckless disregard of the consequences and of the rights of others,
producing the death of Michael Kenneth Blair.” Instruction No. 10. But, Jared’s
defense was that Michael’s act of placing the gun in his mouth was an intervening
cause. Jared’s defense was supported by evidence. In fact, the state presented no
evidence at trial to contradict Khali’s testimony that Michael moved across the seat
and placed the gun in his own mouth after declaring his willingness to die. If
Jared’s defense had been supported by proper instructions, there was a reasonable
probability of a different outcome. See McKay v. State, supra.
Jared raised a genuine issue of material fact as to both deficient performance
and prejudice. Therefore, the district court erred in summarily dismissing the claim
of ineffective assistance of trial counsel in failing to request causation instructions.
Ridgley v. State, supra; Stevens v. State, supra.
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3. The District Court Erred in Summarily Dismissing the Claim of
Ineffective Assistance of Appellate Counsel
The district court summarily dismissed the claim of ineffective assistance of
appellate counsel in failing to raise an issue of fundamental error in failing to
properly instruct the jury as to causation. The court offered two rationales for
dismissal: 1) appellate counsel is charged with determining the best arguments to
be made and the issues raised do not have to be those the client deems worthy; and
2) there was no basis for an intervening cause instruction and if the jury had been
so instructed the outcome would not have been different. R 111.
As set out above, the district court was incorrect in its conclusion that there
was no basis for an intervening cause instruction and if the jury had been
instructed that the outcome would not have been different. Insofar as the district
court’s summary dismissal of the post-conviction claim of ineffective assistance of
appellate counsel was based upon this conclusion, it was erroneous.
While the district court did not cite Mintun v. State, 144 Idaho 656, 660-665,
168 P.3d 40, 44-49 (Ct.App. 2007), that case sets out the current law on ineffective
assistance of appellate counsel post-conviction claims. And, that case does state
that appellants do not have a constitutional right to compel appointed counsel to
press all non-frivolous arguments they wish pursued on appeal. Id. at 661, 168
P.3d at 45.
But, Mintun does not eliminate claims of ineffective assistance of appellate
counsel. In fact, the Court of Appeals held that Mintun’s appellate counsel was
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ineffective in failing to raise a sufficiency of the evidence issue. Id. at 665, 168 P.3d
at 49. Mintun holds that it is possible to bring a Strickland claim of ineffective
assistance of appellate counsel; however, only when ignored issues are clearly
stronger than those presented will the presumption of effective assistance be
overcome. Id. at 661, 168 P.3d at 45.
In this case, Jared claims that appellate counsel was ineffective in not raising
an issue of fundamental error in the failure to properly instruct the jury regarding
causation. This Court must determine whether that claim raised a genuine issue of
material fact so as to survive the motion for summary dismissal.
Mintun held that appellate counsel cannot be ineffective in failing to raise a
claim of fundamental error. The Court reached this conclusion for four reasons: 1)
Idaho case law at the time set no bright line delineating which errors are
fundamental and thus to avoid claims of ineffective assistance, appellate counsel
would be forced to raise all errors on appeal, whether preserved or not, to avoid
being found ineffective, resulting in an intolerable burden on counsel and the
courts; 2) it is often not to the defendant’s advantage to raise fundamental error in
direct appeal because the record will not support the issue and thus can provoke a
disadvantageous ruling which would be res judicata for purposes of post-conviction
review; 3) a trial attorney’s failure to object to the error may have been tactical or
strategic and it would be incorrect to grant relief in such a case; and 4) this type of
claim is not ordinarily necessary because the defendant can bring the same claim as
a claim of ineffective assistance of trial counsel in failing to object in the trial court.
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Mintun should be revisited in light of subsequent developments. Three years
after Mintun, the Supreme Court decided State v. Perry, 150 Idaho 209, 245 P.3d
961 (2010), which clarified the law of fundamental error. Fundamental error can be
raised in direct appeal only when three factors are satisfied: 1) an unwaived
constitutional right was violated; 2) the error is clear or obvious, without the need
for additional information not contained in the appellate record, including
information as to whether the failure to object was a tactical decision; and 3) the
error affected the defendant’s substantial rights, meaning in most cases that it
affected the outcome of the trial proceedings. Id. at 226, 245 P.3d at 978.
Mintun’s first basis for holding that appellate counsel cannot be ineffective
for failure to raise an issue of fundamental error - that Idaho did not have a bright
line delineating categories of errors that will be deemed fundamental - no longer
holds. Idaho law is now very clear as to what constitutes fundamental error.
Mintun’s second basis - that it is often not to the defendant’s advantage to
raise an issue of fundamental error on direct appeal - also no longer holds. State v.
Bias, 159 Idaho 696, 702-703, 365 P.3d 1050, 1056-1057 (Ct. App. 2015), implies
that a constitutional violation which was not raised in direct appeal as an issue of
fundamental error may be waived unless the issue, in the exercise of due diligence
could not have been presented earlier, and may not be raised as a direct claim in
post-conviction. Rather, the violation may only be addressed as a question of
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ineffective assistance of trial counsel.3 If Bias’s implication is in fact the law, then
it places an additional hurtle between an appellant/petitioner and a remedy for a
constitutional violation. If the violation is raised as fundamental error in direct
appeal, per Perry, the appellant need only show that the error is clear and obvious,
including that it was not the result of a strategic or tactical decision on the part of
trial counsel to not object. But, if the violation is not raised until post-conviction,
not only must the petitioner show that the failure to object was not a strategic or
tactical decision, he must also show that the decision to not object was objectively
unreasonable. Strickland, supra. Thus, while it is disadvantageous to raise some
claims as fundamental error in direct appeal because the record does not
demonstrate that the decision to not object is not strategic or tactical, it is also
disadvantageous to not raise some claims as fundamental error in direct appeal
because the choice to not object can be shown to not be strategic and relief can be
obtained more quickly and efficiently in direct appeal as opposed to raising a claim
in post-conviction. On the other hand, if Bias’s implication is not in fact the law, a
careful analysis of standards of review will control whether a constitutional error
should be raised in direct appeal or in post-conviction. Appellate counsel is the only

3

See also, Grove v. State, No. 43537 (Ct. App. Slip Op. filed 2/2/17), petition
for rev. pending, holding that a claim that the state and federal constitutional rights
to confrontation were violated could not be raised in post-conviction. Slip Op. pp. 710. This opinion is contrary to Peltier v. State, 119 Idaho 454, 808 P.2d 373 (1989);
Owen v. State, 130 Idaho 715, 947 P.2d 388 (1997); Odiaga v. State, 130 Idaho 915,
950 P.2d (1997); Berg v. State, 131 Idaho 517, 960 P.2d 738 (1998); DeRushé v.
State, 146 Idaho 599, 200 P.3d 1148 (2008); State v. Wegner, 148 Idaho 270, 220
P.3d 1089 (2009), as well as numerous Court of Appeals’ decisions.
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counsel in the course of the proceedings who can make and act on these complex
determinations, and petitioners should have a remedy through a claim of ineffective
assistance of appellate counsel should appellate counsel be ineffective in the
determinations.
Mintun’s third reason for not allowing claims of ineffective assistance of
appellate counsel for failure to raise fundamental error issues is that the record on
direct appeal would rarely disclose whether trial counsel’s failure to object was
strategic or tactical and it would be incorrect to grant relief to an appellant in such
a case. This reason no longer holds because fundamental error cannot be raised
unless the record shows that the failure to object was not strategic or tactical. State
v. Perry, supra.
Mintun’s fourth reason, that claims of ineffective assistance of appellate
counsel are ordinarily not necessary because the same defect can be addressed as a
claim of ineffective assistance of trial counsel in failing to object in the first place
also no longer holds. As discussed above, Bias v. State, supra, changes that analysis
- some claims will be more difficult to litigate as claims of ineffective assistance of
trial counsel than they would be to litigate as claims of ineffective assistance of
appellate counsel.
Mintun’s complete prohibition of claims of ineffective assistance of appellate
counsel for failure to present issues of fundamental error on appeal should be lifted.
This will not open any flood gates. Very few errors in the trial court amount
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to fundamental error under Perry. And, of those very few errors, even fewer meet
Mintun’s standard for relief - that the fundamental error is clearly stronger than
the issues actually raised on appeal so as to make failure to raise the error deficient
performance that was prejudicial to the petitioner. The path to relief will still be
long and arduous. Only few will attempt it. Even fewer will succeed.
That being said, this is a case where a claim of ineffective assistance of
appellate counsel for failure to raise an issue of fundamental error should be heard.
In the direct appeal, counsel raised a claim of sufficiency of the evidence, premised
on the lack of proof of proximate cause without an intervening cause. However, the
Court of Appeals refused to consider the issue. The Court relied upon Bolognese v.
Forte, 153 Idaho 857, 867, 292 P.3d 248, 258 (2010); Mosell Equities, LLC v.
Berryhill & Co., Inc., 154 Idaho 269, 275, 297 P.3d 232, 238 (2013); and St.
Alphonsus Diversified Care, Inc. V. MRI Assoc. LLP, 157 Idaho 106, 117 n.3, 334
P.3d 780, 791 n. 3 (2014), for the holding that where there has been no objection to
the jury instructions, a sufficiency of the evidence issue must be decided based upon
the instructions given the jury. As stated in Bolognese v. Forte, supra, as quoted in
the Court of Appeals’ opinion in Jared’s appeal, “A party who fails to properly object
to an instruction that misstates the law cannot circumvent Rule 51(b) by arguing
insufficiency of the evidence, based upon a correct statement of the law.” Id. at 867,
n. 6, 292 P.3d at 258, n. 6. Noting that the jury in this case had not been instructed
on proximate cause and intervening cause, the Court of Appeals held that under the
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instructions given - that the evidence must prove that Jared’s handling of the gun
“produced” Michael’s death - the evidence was sufficient. “Whether the evidence
would also have been sufficient to sustain a verdict by a jury instructed on
proximate cause and intervening cause is a different question and one that we
decline to address for the reasons stated.” Augmented R 563-564.
Appellate counsel determined that the evidence was insufficient to support a
finding of guilt if the law of proximate cause and intervening cause are properly
applied. And, counsel attempted to have this issue decided by the Court in Jared’s
favor. However, counsel did so by a means doomed to fail because the sufficiency of
the evidence had to be determined by the jury instructions given. Bolognese v.
Forte, supra.
Instead, counsel should have raised an issue of fundamental error in failing
to instruct on proximate and intervening cause. State v. Hadden, 152 Idaho 371,
271 P.3d 1227 (Ct.App. 2013), provides authority for this means of relief.
Per Hadden, the question of whether the jury has been properly instructed is
a question of law over which the appellate court exercises free review. Id. at 374,
271 P.3d at 1230. The court must determine whether the instructions as a whole
fairly and accurately reflect the applicable law. Id.
Also, per Hadden, failure to properly instruct the jury may be raised as
fundamental error in accord with Perry. In Hadden, the fundamental error
argument failed because Hadden could not meet the second prong of the Perry test,
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that the error plainly exists because Idaho appellate courts had never disavowed
the use of the instruction Hadden claimed was erroneously given. Id. at 375-376,
271 P.3d at 1231-1232.
In this case, unlike Hadden, there was fundamental error in the failure to
instruct the jury on proximate and intervening cause:
1) The error violated Jared’s Fifth Amendment right to due process and
Sixth Amendment right to a jury determination of guilt of all the elements of the
charged crime. United States v. Gaudin, 515 U.S. 506, 511, 115 S.Ct. 2310, 2314
(1995). Under the instructions given, the jury could return a guilty verdict without
a finding on the element of causation.
2) The error plainly exists. As discussed above, the law clearly holds that
proximate cause is an element to be decided by the jury. State v. Montheith, supra.
And, further, there could be no strategic reason to base the entire defense on the
lack of proximate cause and the existence of an intervening cause, yet not request
the instructions allowing the jury to consider the question of causation. McKay v.
State, supra.
3) The error was not harmless. The harmless error test for fundamental
error requires the defendant to prove a reasonable possibility that the error affected
the outcome of the trial. State v. Perry, 150 Idaho at 226, 245 P.3d at 978.
Considering the facts of this case, it is reasonably possible that had the jury been
instructed on proximate and intervening cause, the jury would have acquitted or
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hung because the state failed to prove that Jared’s actions were the proximate cause
of Michael’s death and/or that Michael’s actions were not an intervening cause.
Had the fundamental error in the instructions been raised on direct appeal, it is
reasonably probable that the appellate court would have vacated the conviction.
Perry v. State, supra.
Jared raised a genuine issue of material fact as to whether the fundamental
error in the instructions issue was clearly stronger than the sufficiency of the
evidence issue appellate counsel raised, overcoming the presumption of effective
assistance of counsel. Mintun v. State, 144 Idaho at 661, 168 P.3d at 45. Further
he raised a genuine issue of material fact that had appellate counsel raised the
fundamental error claim, the appellate court would have vacated his conviction.
See State v. Perry, 150 Idaho at 228, 245 P.3d at 980. Thus, the district court erred
in summarily dismissing this claim from his petition for post-conviction relief.
Ridgley v. State, supra.
Further, this Court should not condone the dismissal of this claim simply
because the instructional error is also key to the claim of ineffective assistance of
trial counsel. Neither the UPCPA nor Idaho case law prohibits Jared from arguing
both ineffective assistance of trial and appellate counsel. And, as set out, both
counsel were ineffective in this case although for different reasons. This Court
should allow Jared to present his full proof as to both these theories for relief. See
I.C. § 19-4901.
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V. CONCLUSION
This case raises a clear probability that Jared has been convicted and
imprisoned even though he is not guilty of involuntary manslaughter because he
was not the proximate cause of Michael’s death. This Court should allow full
litigation of the validity of the conviction. While it may seem expedient to bar the
courtroom door once the jury leaves by imposing greater and greater impediments
to review on direct appeal and in post-conviction, such is contrary to our history.
As Blackstone stated:
All presumptive evidence of felony should be admitted cautiously; for
the law holds it better that ten guilty persons escape, than that one
innocent party suffer.
Blackstone, Commentaries on the Laws of England, 9th ed., book 4, chapter 27, p.
358 (1783, reprinted 1978).
. . . I view the requirement of proof beyond a reasonable doubt in a
criminal case as bottomed on a fundamental value determination of
our society that it is far worse to convict an innocent man than to let a
guilty man go free.
In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 372, 90 S.Ct. 1068, 1077 (1970), Harlen, J.
Concurring.
Jared asks this Court to reverse the summary dismissal of his petition for
post-conviction relief and remand with instructions to either grant relief or to hold
an evidentiary hearing.
Respectfully submitted this 22nd day of March, 2017.
/s/Deborah Whipple
Deborah Whipple
Attorney for Jared Thompson
31

CERTIFICATE OF COMPLIANCE AND SERVICE
The undersigned does hereby certify that the electronic brief submitted is in
compliance with all of the requirements set out in I.A.R. 34.1, and that an electronic
copy was served on each party at the following email address(es):
Idaho State Attorney General
Criminal Law Division
ecf@ag.idaho.gov
Dated and certified this 22nd day of March, 2017.

/s/Deborah Whipple
Deborah Whipple

32

